Q1 Before the summit, you were concerned that Trump would agree to a deal that would give too much to North Korea. But Trump in fact made no deal at all. You said in another interview that you think it was bad news for Kim Jong-un and that the “power dynamics” have shifted. Can you elaborate on that?

Yes, I think the fact that there was no deal was most disappointing for Kim Jong-un, who you remember, came all the way [to] Hanoi which is a 65 hour train ride each way. I do believe that Kim Jong-un expected to reach a deal in which some denuclearization would occur. Specifically giving up Yongbyon, which is their declared nuclear site, in return for substantial relief from sanctions. In the end, that proved too much for President Trump to give in, on sanctions, and so he walked way. So for Kim, who has very much valued sanctions relief above everything else, he goes home empty handed. And so I think that the dynamics are very, very disappointing for him at this moment.

Q2 Although some say no deal is better than a bad deal, others might say that Trump is the loser as well. North Korea did not give up any nuclear weapons and it was a diplomatic failure, especially considering how much he staked his relationship with the North Korean leader. Do you agree with that assessment?

To say no deal is better than a bad deal is rhetoric only. Of course no deal is better than a bad deal, nobody wants a bad deal. But the question is, could there have been some deal, limited in scope, that could have been advantageous to both sides. I tend to think yes, ultimately. After all, they agreed on elements like having a declaration to end the war, exchanging diplomatic liaison offices, restoring humanitarian assistance. Those are not nothing. So to say that only [a] bad deal was on the table, I think it speaks volumes about [the] lack of preparation that had gone in – in other words, not much preparation. So yes, they were not ready for the huge deal that would end [the] nuclear threat, that would end six, seven decades of enmity between the U.S. and North Korea, no they were not ready for that. But I do believe they could have salvaged something, and to me it is a regretful situation that they salvaged nothing.

Q3 North Korea has since threatened to walk away from the continuing talks with the U.S.  In your experience negotiating with North Korea, how seriously do you take this threat? Is it the kind of negotiating tactic you would expect them to use?

I think this time around, they have expressed it so clearly, and at a very high level. Obviously, word for word approval by the highest leader, Kim Jong-un, so you have to take that seriously. Nobody wants to go back to where we were in 2017, the so called ‘fire and fury’, where I certainly believed that there was a significant likelihood of military hostilities breaking out on [the] Korean Peninsula. We don’t want to go back to that. I do hope that diplomats on both sides will get down [to] work and start building a process so that you don’t have another huge spike in tensions that leads to the situation that was in 2017.

Q4 It’s kind of a standoff situation right now. How can differences between Washington and Pyongyang be narrowed?

At the moment, you’re right; we are in a standoff situation that was created by the summit. When the leaders create a standoff, it is very, very difficult for lower levels officials to gloss over their differences. We’re now in a tough spot. I don’t see there’s much give, immediately, on the American side, nor do I see the immediate give on the North Korean side. However, I also don’t think either side would react – in other words go back to where we were quickly. For North Korea, that would mean testing a nuclear device or a missile, and for the United States that would be resuming large scale joint military exercises with South Korea. As long as these two things don’t take place, I think we can maintain this standoff situation. But I wouldn’t put my money on how long this standoff will last without one side or the other going off. This is why diplomats from both sides – not at the summit level, obviously, but at [the] working level – have to get together, try to salvage what was on the table, [and] improve on it a little bit as far as both [sides] are concerned. For the American side, [this] would mean giving up somewhat on sanctions, and [for] the North Korean side, it would mean increasing the offer on denuclearization, not just Yongbyon, but perhaps through a declaration that would consist of accounting of nuclear weapons [and] fissile material. That would go some way to improve the package as far as both sides can see.

Q4 (follow-up) So you're saying we need a step-by-step approach?

We need to see a step-by-step approach. When Washington walked away from [that] step-by-step approach, I don’t think that was helpful because there is no other possible approach.

Q5 What do you say to critics that say such an approach is a way for North Korea to buy time, and may even help Pyongyang fund its nuclear program?

Trying other methods has not worked so far. North Korea’s program is now, what, 30-35, 20-25 years old? They’ve had a nuclear weapon since 2006. Trying to sanction them has not worked. Trying a hard line approach has not worked. So now we’ve got to have a mixture of both. Otherwise you’re gonna move on from the current situation, to a much worse situation. I’m afraid that denying them their economic livelihood has not really worked so well so far.

Q6 Obviously this is a blow to South Korean President Moon Jae-in.  He has put a lot at stake on the successful inter-Korean relationship and it does not help having no progress in U.S.-North Korea relations. The Moon administration have been offering inter-Korean cooperation as a way for Washington to offer incentives to North Korea. What do you think of the tactic?

South Korea and [the] U.S. are alliance partners. They both have [a] mutual defense treaty, and they both have commitments to defend each other against other enemies. So in this situation, these are the North Koreans. It is very, very important that both Seoul and Washington make it clear that both are on the same page. Many ideas coming from Seoul are good, but they should be kept on quiet channels, they should not be announced publically, so that differences are obvious to see. Differences should be patched up through quiet talks between the two capitals. I’m afraid right now there [is] too much public discourse accentuating differences rather than the unity between the two alliance partners. As alliance partners, the U.S. and South Korea should be speaking with the same voice.

Q7 What should South Korea do next?

South Korea has a role to speak to North Korea through backchannels, as well as continue quiet consultations with the United States, and make sure there is no gap between Seoul and Washington.

Q8 Are you concerned at all by reports that suggest activity at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in Dongchang-ri?

The satellite has nothing to do with [the] nuclear program, of course. The satellite program is different than the nuclear program. The satellite program is a part of their missile program, so it’s part of their delivery side. As far as Dongchang-ri is concerned, they had promised South Korean President Moon Jae-in that Dongchang-ri would be dismantled. That was back [in the] [declaration] last September. So it is a little disturbing that instead of dismantling it, they seem to be now trying to refurbish it. That is disappointing.

Q9 How successful do you think Trump’s policy on North Korea has been? Are we in a better or worse situation than before he came to office?  How do you assess his dealings with North Korea?

President Trump, in dealing with North Korea, has been somewhat unique in the sense that he has taken the problem on by himself. This is summit diplomacy. No other American president has done so. This is not because they didn’t have the opportunity; in my experience, whether it was Kim Ill-sung, Kim Jong-il, or Kim Jong-un, they’ve always wanted to have a meeting with [a] U.S. leader. But that hasn’t happened [before] President Trump. Doing so has changed the dynamic quite a bit. I think it was right for him to have [a] summit in Singapore, because we were heading into a very, very difficult situation in 2017. But at the same time, to continue the summit without results, as we have seen in Hanoi, has been disappointing. I would hope now [that] the U.S. side, instead of continuing with summit level diplomacy, try to build a process in which [the] working level can negotiate, make progress, step by step, so that there is something that everyone – the international community, the regional interested parties – can support. That should be the goal: to build a diplomatic proc